Since 9/11, a number of terrorist plots, including those planned by right-wing extremists, have been interdicted in the western democracies. In particular, infiltration of extremist fascist groups by the western intelligence services has been successful in preventing any right-wing macro-terror plot, such as a possible repeat of the 1995 Oklahoma bombing. A continuing concern to the FBI is the lone offender: ‘a single individual driven to hateful attacks based on a particular set of beliefs without a larger group’s knowledge or support.’ The FBI believes that most U.S. domestic attacks are carried out by lone offenders to promote their own grievances and agendas.
Even in western countries with the most effective and well-resourced counter-terrorism services, catching lone wolf terrorists is difficult and haphazard. With a minimal social network of plotters, the chance may only be one in four. Accordingly in February 2010, CIA director Leon Panetta reckoned the lone wolf strategy to be the main terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland.
“In a small outlying peaceful country such as Norway, where the authorities ranked the terrorist threat as low, and dismissed right-wing extremism as not a serious threat, there would only have been a very slim chance of stopping a lone wolf terrorist through intelligence gathering,” said Dr. Gordon Woo, catastrophist at RMS.
Capability of Lone Wolf Attacks
If a lone wolf manages to evade detection by the intelligence services, the amount of harm he could cause depends crucially on the level of target security. As a nation priding itself as an open society, the level of urban security has been kept purposely low in Norway. In contrast with Downing Street or the White House, the Norwegian Prime Minister’s office was publicly accessible with minimal ID and no baggage checks. A plan to construct barriers protecting the central complex of government buildings was due to be implemented in a few months’ time, after a decade of post 9/11 procrastination.
A tragic price for such societal openness was paid on Friday, 22 July 2011, when a major terrorist attack was mounted against the ruling Labour party of Norway by a right-wing extremist Islamophobe Anders Behring Breivik. A self-confessed lone wolf, it is possible he may have had a limited degree of plot assistance.
“The large scale of Breivik’s successful attack was made possible by the general lack of terrorism risk awareness of a country without any notable terrorism experience within its own borders,” continued Dr. Woo. “The Norwegian government tolerated outspoken anti-American diatribes of mullah Krekar, head of Ansar-al-Islam, who claimed he was an insurance policy against Islamist attacks in Norway. Additionally, few rather minor Jihadi incidents have occurred, such as the firing of gunshots in the Oslo synagogue in 2006; the arrest in 2008 of Somalis for terrorist fundraising on behalf of Al Shabab; and the arrest in 2010 of three Norwegian residents with Al Qaeda links.”
Preparations for an attack could be conducted patiently by an ethnic Norwegian without interference or obstruction from the authorities, or tip-offs from vigilant fellow citizens. Rather like the American lone wolf Unabomber, the educated Breivik wrote his own lengthy rambling political manifesto, which shows that very careful thought and systematic scheduling went into the meticulous planning of his entire operation. The bomb attack in Oslo drew in police resources, which facilitated his subsequent assault on the Labour party youth summer camp on the island of Utoeya. Dressed as a policeman, he was able to shoot more of the defenceless teenagers. The most cunning terrorists are the most dangerous.
For a home-grown right-wing terrorist intent on perpetrating a spectacular domestic attack, Norway was an ideal safe haven, as Afghanistan was for Al Qaeda before 9/11. Thus there were no constraints or ID checks against the procurement of 6 tons of artificial fertilizer from an agricultural supply company. Half of this quantity was found at Breivek’s farm. Allowing for some proper agricultural usage, and some for bomb testing, he might have packed as much as two tons into the delivery van that was parked close to the energy ministry.
In the more terror-prone USA or the principal countries of western Europe, it would require a group of conspirators to acquire several tons of fertilizer, without attracting the attention of security services or the suspicion of vigilant citizens. In 2004, five terrorists were caught in the U.K. stockpiling a ton of fertilizer and planning bombing raids. Both the quantity of fertilizer purchased for supposedly garden purposes, and the prolonged duration of its storage, raised public alarm.
Lessons for the Future
One of RMS’ longstanding terrorist expert advisers, Dr. Magnus Ranstorp, has pointed out in the wake of the Oslo attacks that counter-terrorism intelligence services across Europe are rightly concerned about the lone wolf. European security services will now be trying to glean as much information as possible from their Norwegian counterparts.
In seeking to draw lessons from Oslo on the capability of lone wolves, account needs to be taken of the much tougher counter-terrorism environment in those western democracies, such as U.S., U.K., France and Germany, which have already experienced violent terrorist threats, and responded accordingly by strengthening defensive measures.
A copycat lone wolf attack in the larger western countries would not thus have the same latitude and opportunity to perpetrate a similar amount of carnage and destruction. However, for European countries with low terrorism threat perception, such as Finland, Austria, and Switzerland, lax counter-terrorism security may permit right-wing extremists to launch spectacular terrorist attacks.
Source : RMS
